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CANADIAN OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
AND SAFETY LEGISLATION
By RICHARD M. BROWN*
I. INTRODUCTION
No area of Canadian employment law has undergone greater fer-
ment in the last decade than has occupational health and safety. In 1972
Saskatchewan became the first province to pass a comprehensive health and
safety act embracing the entire working population.' Nova Scotia, Prince
Edward Island and British Columbia are the only jurisdictions that have not
followed suit 2
An ocupational health and safety statute must respond to three chal-
lenges. The law should strive to ensure that both labour and management
devote their best efforts to the prevention of injury and disease. As control
of many aspects of the work environment has been a management pre-
rogative, the scope for worker participation in the prevention of injury and
disease must be increased. In addition to bolstering the internal responsi-
bility system, the law must provide a framework for the creation and
enforcement of minimum legal standards. Finally, the traditional legal focus
upon industrial accidents must be broadened to include occupational
disease. This paper examines the response of Canadian legislatures to these
challenges-but a word of caution is in order: many legislative provisions
are no more than promises that an administering agency may fail to
fulfill.
II. THE RIGHT TO KNOW
An employee's right to know the hazards of work rests upon a basic
human entitlement to information that bears directly upon bodily integrity.
Information is also a central part of an effective campaign against injury
0 Copyright, 1982, Richard M. Brown.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Victoria.
'Occupational Health Act, 1972, S.S. 1972, c. 86. This statute has been superceded
by the Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. 0-1.
2 This paper examines the new, comprehensive acts. Where none exists, the statute
that applies to the industrial workforce is considered. The relevant statutes are: Canada
Labour Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. L-1, as am. by S.C. 1977-78, c. 27 [hereinafter Canada];
Alberta, The Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.A. 1980, c. 0-2 [hereinafter
Alberta]; British Columbia, Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 437 and B.C.
Reg. 585/77 as am. by B.C. Reg. 374/79 [hereinafter British Columbia]; Manitoba,
Workplace Safety and Health Act, S.M. 1976, c. 63 [hereinafter Manitoba]; New Bruns-
wick, Occupational Safety Act, S.N.B. 1976, c. 0-0.1 [hereinafter New Brunswick]; Nova
Scotia, Industrial Safety Act, R.S.N.S. 1978, c. I-11 [hereinafter Nova Scotia]; New-
foundland, The Occupational Health and Safety Act, S. Nfld. 1978, c. 23 [hereinafter
Newfoundland]; Ontario, Occupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 321
[hereinafter Ontario]; Prince Edward Island, Workers Compensation Act, R.S.P.E.I.
1974, c. W-10 [hereinafter Prince Edward Island]; Quebec, An Act Respecting Occupa-
tional Health and Safety, S.Q. 1979, c. 63 [hereinafter Quebec]; Saskatchewan, Oc-
cupational Health and Safety Act, R.S.S. 1978, c. 0-1 [hereinafter Saskatchewan].
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and disease because all strategies that are designed to promote health and
safety depend ultimately upon a knowledgeable workforce. Joint labour-
management committees and worker representatives cannot fulfill their
functions without adequate information concerning occupational hazards.
Neither the right to refuse unsafe work nor protective reassignment can be
invoked by a worker to escape exposure to an unknown risk. Similarly,
workers who do not have access to facts cannot participate effectively in the
establishment or enforcement of standards.5 Even the most vociferous oppo-
nents of government regulation, who would prefer to allow the level of
health and safety to be determined by the market, recognize that informa-
tion is of vital importance to economic efficiency. Perhaps the strongest
criticism levelled at the performance of governments and employers is that
they frequently fail to inform workers, but little has been done to remedy
this problem.
Several statutes fail to address the right to know. Employers in other
jurisdictions are obliged to provide workers with all information necessary
to ensure their health and safety, 4 but this obligation is deficient in several
respects. First, it neither extends to information in the sole possession of the
administering agency nor embraces information about persons who may be
slowly developing a latent disease caused by employment that has ter-
minated. Second, there is no requirement that the risks of employment be
recorded in writing to aid communication and to facilitate surveillance of
employer compliance.5 Finally, the duty provides no guidance as to the
type of information that must be provided.
More specific disclosure requirements should be adopted. Information
relating to the causes of occupational illness is especially vital because
many employees are not aware of these hazards. In several jurisdictions,
management is obliged to identify all dangerous substances used or emitted
in the workplace. 6 Knowledge of the identity of a material is only useful
as a means to determining its harmful characteristics and elsewhere em-
ployers may be required to describe those threats to health,7 to record this
information in writing,8 and to display it on container labels.9 Employers
are offered little guidance as to the scope of their duty, however, as only a
few hazardous materials have been enumerated-lead, benzol, benzene, ar-
3 See text accompanying note 97, infra.
4 Manitoba, s. 4(2)(b); Newfoundland, s. 5(b), (c); Ontario, s. 14(2) (a) (c); The
Occupational Health and General Regulations, R.R.S. 1980-81, c. 0-1, Reg. 1, s. 5(c)
[hereinafter Sask. Reg.].
6 Except in Quebec. See Quebec, s. 52.
6 Canada, Dangerous Substances Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 997, s. 15 [hereinafter
C.R.C. 1978, c. 997]; British Columbia, B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 12.01; Newfoundland,
Nfld. Reg. 104/79, s. 25(3); Ontario, R.R.O. 1980, No. 692, s. 134; Quebec, s. 51(13);.
Sask. Reg., s. 68.
7B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 12.01; Nfld. Reg. 104/79, s. 25(5)(b); Ontario, R.R.O.
1980, No. 692, s. 134; see also Alberta, s. 24.
8Sask. Reg., s. 67(1), (2), (3); Nfld. Reg. 104/79, s. 25(3).
0 C.R.C. 1978, c. 997, ss. 19, 20; B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 12; Nfld. Reg. 104/79,
s. 25(2)(c); Sask. Reg. 58/75, s. 12 and Sask. Reg., s. 117.
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senic, hydrocyanic acid, carbon tetrachloride, and some carcinogens. 10 Al-
though an exhaustive list is not possible, notice of the danger associated
with all regulated substances should be required because the existence of a
standard signals a risk that almost always exceeds zero even when legal com-
pliance is achieved. In Saskatchewan the obligation to disclose is widely
extended to any material that is held suspect by workers." The precise
nature of the risk that must be disclosed is almost never specified by law.
A Saskatchewan worker must, however, be informed that asbestos may cause
pneumonoconiosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma, and that the risk of harm
is increased by smoking.'2
The information that workers need is often not known to management,
so imposing a duty to disclose is futile. An employer in Newfoundland,
however, is directed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the composition
and risk of materials from suppliers.13 As a breach of this duty would be
difficult to establish and reasonable efforts may fail to achieve results, the
statute strives to involve workers in the pursuit of information by obliging
an employer to inform them of the trade name and manufacturer of any
substance that is suspect. A far more efficient way of disseminating infor-
mation relating to a dangerous product would be to require the manu-
facturer to disclose prescribed information on a label. Disclosure is opposed
by manufacturers on the ground that it would allow competitors access to
trade secrets. The disclosure of occupational risks and the protection of
commercial recipes are not compatible, but one strategy that might only
slightly compromise these two conflicting objectives would be to compel the
identification of chemical components-and perhaps approximate propor-
tions-but not the precise amount of each.14
A further problem is that an employer may be unaware of the amount
of a contaminant in the occupational environment. Under the Ontario Act,
management may be required by regulation to keep accurate records of the
use and level of biological, chemical or physical agents in the workplace,
of the exposure of each person to these agents, and to disclose this data' 5 -
but no regulations have yet been passed.
Workers should be offered other information possessed by management
or government. Access to reports of inspections and accident investigations,
conducted by an administering agency or employer, and receipt of compli-
ance orders allows workers to assess the efforts that are being directed to-
wards their protection and may disclose latent dangers. The existence of a
health hazard and the severity and frequency of consequent illness may be
revealed by management or government epidemiological studies or monitor-
1oB.C. Reg. 585/77, ss. 12.23, 35.01; Man. Reg. 208/77, s. 2; Quebec, s. 64,
223(3), (20).
11 Supra, note 9.
12 Sask. Reg., s. 115.
13Nfld. Reg. 104/79, s. 25(2)(b), (3); see also Sask. Reg., s. 67(2), (4).
14Quebec, ss. 67, 234; see also Ontario, s. 34(1)(b) and Canada, s. 93(2).
15 Ontario, s. 15(1)(c), (d), (f); see also Quebec, s. 51(13), 180(6).
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ing programmes. Disclosure of workers' compensation board data relating
to an employer's claims experience would serve a parallel purpose, at least
with respect to injuries that often lead to compensation. One final type of
information concerns not the existence of a risk but methods of controlling
it. Employers who have knowledge of work practices and standards in simi-
lar establishments and industries should be required to share it with workers.
Each of these informational needs has been met in one or more jurisdictions,
but not in most. 16
III. HEALTH AND SAFETY COMMITTEES AND REPRESENTATIVES
A central tenet of Canadian occupational health and safety law is that
hazards can only be effectively controlled through the combined efforts of
workers and employers. Joint committees and worker representatives have
been widely adopted as the primary vehicles of shared responsibility.
A committee may be established by law in every jurisdiction except
Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia. 17 At least one-half of the members
must represent the workforce;18 and they may be chosen by a trade union
where one exists.19 Two co-chairmen, one representing each side, direct the
activities of a committee in several jurisdictions.20 A minimum membership
requirement, either two or four, is typical and a maximum may be set. 21
Generally, a meeting must be held quarterly2 and minutes are either to be
filed routinely with the administering agency or produced upon request.23
16Inspection and accident reports and orders are addressed in Canada, s.
84.1(4)(c); British Columbia, s. 71(3); Manitoba, s. 32 and Man. Reg. 158/77, s.
8(2); Ontario, s. 29(6); Quebec, s. 186; Saskatchewan, s. 18(4), (5) and Sask. Reg.,
ss. 28(1), 29(1). As to epidemiological and other studies, see Canada, s. 84.1(4) (1),
(e); Sask. Reg., s. 28(2). Workers' compensation claims data is covered by Ontario,
s. 9 and the practices and standards at other worksites are addressed in Ontario, s.8 (b), (d) (ii).
17 Canada, s. 84.1(1); Alberta, s. 25(1) and Alta. Reg. 218/77, 306/77 and 91/78;
B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 4.02(2); Manitoba, s. 40(1) and Man. Reg. 235/80; N.B. Reg.
77-1, s. 3(6); Newfoundland, s. 35 and Nfld. Reg. 104/79, s. 4; Ontario, s. 8(1), (2);
Quebec, ss. 68, 69, 204; Saskatchewan, s. 24(1).
18 Canada, s. 84.1(2); Alberta, s. 25(3); B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 4.04(1)(b);
Manitoba, s. 40(2); N.B. Reg. 77-1, s. 3(6)(a); Newfoundland, s. 36(2); Ontario, s.
8(5); Quebec, s. 71; Saskatchewan, s. 24(2).
19Canada, s. 84.1(2); Manitoba, s. 40(2); Ontario, s. 8(5); Quebec, s. 72. The
Newfoundland Act allows either workers or the union to make the choice; see s. 36(3).
The same is true in Saskatchewan; see s. 24(2). In Alberta, the trade union plays a
more limited role in the selection of the Committee; see Alta. Reg. 197/77, s. 4(2).
2 0Canada, S.O.R. 78/559, s. 3; Alta. Reg. 197/77, s. 6(1), (2); Man. Reg.
158/77, s. 5; Sask. Reg., s. 20(2).
21 Canada, S.O.R. 78/559, s. 3; Alta. Reg. 197/77, s. 2; B.C. Reg. 585/77, s.
4.04(1)(a); Manitoba, s. 40(2); Newfoundland, s. 36(1); Ontario, s. 8(s), Sask-
atchewan, s. 24(2).
22Canada, s. 84.1(6); Alta. Reg. 197/77, s. 7(1); Man. Reg. 158/77, s. 6(1);
N.B. Reg. 77-1, s. 3(6)(g); Newfoundland, s. 38; Ontario, s. 8(11); Quebec, s. 74;
Sask. Reg., s. 21.
23 Canada, s. 84.1(5) and S.O.R. 78/559, s. 11; Alta. Reg. 197/77, s. 6(3); B.C.
Reg. 585/77, s. 4.06(2)(e); N.B. Reg. 77-1, s. 3(6)(g); Ontario, s. 8(7); Sask. Reg.,
s. 25.
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A code of practice for committee procedures has been promulgated in Mani-
toba.24
Committee members perform several statutory functions.26 Perhaps the
most important task is the identification of hazards and the communication
of these dangers to the workforce. The information that worker committee
members are entitled to receive from management and government under Ca-
nadian law has been described above.20 A committee may also collect data
respecting injuries, disease and workplace environmental conditions by con-
ducting inspections, accident investigations or by receiving employee com-
plaints.
Knowledge of hazards is the first step towards rectifying them. Informed
employees may through their own conduct protect themselves from some
harm, but management has the sole authority to control many aspects of
the occupational environment. An employer is generally obliged to consult
with worker committee members0 7 and, in the event of disagreement, they
may call upon the inspectorate to determine whether the current state of af-
fairs contravenes a legal standard. The Quebec Act intrudes more deeply
than those of other provinces into traditional employer prerogatives. In that
province, a committee may choose the physician in charge of health services
at a workplace, approve the physician's health programme, design training
and information programmes, and select individual protective devices. 28 In
these decisions, labour and management have an equal voice and, in the
case of a stalemate, either may submit an issue to the Commission for deter-
mination.2 9 As in other jurisdictions, the employer cedes no real power to
workers as management retains a veto over committee decisions, but in
Quebec, the administering agency plays a larger role. The Commission may
provide detailed directions for future conduct and is not limited to either
enjoining violations of minimum standards capable of application to all
employers, or enforcing a vague general duty clause.30 Management's re-
sponse to the demands of worker committee members will be conditioned
by their ability to invoke these government powers; inability to predict Com-
mission decisions will induce both sides to accommodate one another. The
areas in which management shares responsibility with labour in this way are
24 Man. Reg. 158/77, s. 1(3). Code of Practice published in the Manitoba Gazette,
Sept. 10, 1977.
25 Canada, s. 81.1(4); Alberta, s. 25(1) and Alta. Reg. 197/77, s. 9; B.C. Reg.
577/78, s. 4.06; Manitoba, s. 40(5); N.B. Reg. 77-1, s. 3(6); Newfoundland, s. 37;
Ontario, s. 8(6), (8), (9); Quebec, s. 78; Saskatchewan, ss. 22(4) and (5) and Sask.
Reg., s. 11.
26 See text accompanying notes 3 to 16, supra.
27 Several statutes explicitly direct an employer to co-operate with a committee:
Manitoba, s. 4(1)(e); Newfoundland, s. 5(8); Quebec, s. 51(14); Saskatchewan, s.
3(b). In several provinces employees are also directed to co-operate with a committee:
Manitoba, s. 5(c); Newfoundland, s. 7(1)(b); Quebec, s. 49(6).
28Quebec, s. 78(1)-(4).
29 Quebec, ss. 73, 79.
30 Quebec, ss. 166, 167.
[VOL. 20, NO. 1
Occupational Health and Safety
of vital importance to workers, but do not relate to the design of the pro-
duction process which is jealously guarded by employers.
A worker committee member may perform two other functions. When
a person refuses to perform a task because a danger is perceived, a member
may participate in the resolution of any ensuing dispute.3 ' A worker mem-
ber may also be entitled to accompany an inspector during a visit to a
workplace.m
The breadth of coverage of the committee system varies greatly. Under
the Canada Labour Code and in Manitoba and Alberta, committees
are required in workplaces designated by the minister.33 Elsewhere, the crea-
tion of a committee is generally dependant upon the number of workers at
an establishment exceeding a fixed minimum-twenty is a common figure.
This approach might be seen as a small business exemption designed to
lighten the regulatory load borne by entrepreneurs. The rigidity of a numeri-
cal formula may be softened by factors that reflect hazard levels. In British
Columbia, the minimum number ranges from twenty to fifty, depending upon
the risk associated with an industry as determined by the Workers' Com-
pensation Board; presumably upon the basis of claims experience. Yet the
relationship between claims and risk is quite weak with respect to health, as
opposed to safety, because of the long latency period of many occupational
diseases, failures of diagnoses and etiological uncertainties. Health concerns
have achieved a higher profile in Ontario where a committee must be estab-
lished at every worksite at which a regulated substance is utilized. The On-
tario Act excludes offices, shops, restaurants, theatres and several other
types of establishments, apparently because these are believed to be relatively
safe places to work.34
In several provinces, a worker safety representative may be appointed
at a workplace where a committee is not created. The functions of health
and safety representatives are virtually identical to those of committees. 3
The selection of a representative is mandatory for every Ontario construc-
tion project where more than twenty persons are employed.3 6 In that pro-
vince, and in two others, the minister may require the appointment of a worker
to this post at any worksite without a committee.37 A representative must
be chosen at certain establishments in Quebec despite the existence of a
committee,38 perhaps because the committee system is too awkward and slow
31 See text accompanying notes 62 and 67, infra.
32 See text accompanying notes 128 and 129, infra.
33 S upra note 17.
34 The hazardous construction industry also appears in the list of exclusions but a
single worker representative may be named at a construction site. Although the transient
character of both job sites and employees in this industry may render the committee
system cumbersome, these bodies are utilized in the Quebec construction industry.
35 Manitoba, s. 41(4), (5); Newfoundland, s. 42(1); Ontario, s. 7(6)-(8); Quebec, s. 90.
3 6 Ontario, s. 7(1).
37 Manitoba, s. 41(1); Newfoundland, s. 39; Ontario, s. 7(2), (4).
s.90.
38 Quebec, ss. 87, 88. Different criteria apply to the construction industry; see s.
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to carry out some tasks. In British Columbia, an employer must hold
monthly meetings with employees to discuss their concerns, even where no
committee or representative exists."
Worker participation cannot be effective unless employees are assured
that committee membership, appointment as a representative, or association
with others who hold these positions will not jeopardize employment or in-
come security. Typically, the work of committees and representatives must
be carried out during work hours or be remunerated. 40 Management retalia-
tion against employees is generally forbidden. 41 Worker participation may be
bolstered by other types of support. A Quebec employer must provide prem-
ises, apparatus and clerical assistance,4 and in Saskatchewan, a worker
committee member is granted paid educational leave for five days each year
to attend courses sponsored by the administering agency. 43
IV. THE RIGHT TO REFUSE
The concept of joint responsibility, manifested at the level of the work-
force in committees and representatives, also finds expression in the right of
an individual employee to refuse to perform unsafe tasks without fear of
employer retaliation. A refusal to work not only allows an employee to es-
cape exposure to a danger, but may also compel management to rectify an
ongoing health or safety deficiency. Unlike the committee system, a work
refusal, especially by a person who must be paid, exerts economic pressure
upon an employer. The right to refuse and the committee system bolster one
another. The power of an individual to stop work provides a lever that may
be utilized by an employee committee member who enjoys the support of
endangered workers. Committee members can ensure that the right to refuse
is used, but not abused, by disseminating information about occupational
hazards and the legal protection afforded to a person who exercises this
right. Worker committee members may also play a role in the resolution of
disputes concerning the existence of a danger and may ensure that an em-
ployee who refuses work in accordance with the law suffers no harm.
The vast majority of Canadian workers are protected against acts of
retaliation for declining to perform unsafe work. 44 Only in Nova Scotia and
Prince Edward Island is protection not provided. Most right to refuse pro-
39 B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 4.02(3); see also N.B. Reg. 77-1, s. 3(5).
40 Canada, s. 84.1(7); Alberta, s. 25(5); Man. Reg. 158/77, s. 10; Newfoundland,
s. 38; Ontario, ss. 8(12), 7(9); Quebec, ss. 74, 76, 92, 96; Sask. Reg., s. 24. In Quebec
worker committee members and safety representatives must give notice to their super-
visors before leaving their jobs; see ss. 77, 93.
41 See text accompanying notes 155 to 166, infra.
42 Quebec, ss. 51(15), 94.
43 Sask. Reg., s. 27.
44 Canada, s. 82.1(1); Alberta, s. 28; B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 8.24(1); Manitoba, s
43(1), (3); New Brunswick, s. 8(3), (4); Newfoundland, s. 43(1); Ontario, ss. 23(3),
24(1), 28(1)-(3); Quebec, ss. 12, 30, 31; Saskatchewan, ss. 26(1), (2). Unionized
employees, who may be disciplined only for just cause, cannot be disciplined for refusing
to perform unsafe work. See Brown and Beatty, Canadian Labour Arbitration (Don
Mills, 1977) at 348-50.
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visions appear to confer upon employees an option to stop work, but these
provisions must be read in conjunction with the statutory obligation upon
workers to safeguard their own health and the well-being of others.4 The
apparent right is in fact a duty.
Legal protection of a person who refuses to work is typically triggered
by the existence of a "danger". 46 This concept may be broken down into two
components-the gravity of the harm and the probability that it will occur.
Relief against discipline has been granted to a person who declined to incur
a very remote risk of serious harm or death-although these factors were
not addressed. 47 In the field of occupational health and safety, the concept
of danger entails another important element. The cost of avoiding an antici-
pated harm is as pertinent in the context of a work refusal as in the estab-
lishment of standards because zero risk is often not economically practical.
48
To ignore financial considerations in right to refuse cases would be to allow
workers to withdraw their services without loss of pay in order to obtain
working conditions that could not be achieved through the standard-setting
process.
Immediacy of exposure to risk is a further element of the concept of
danger in the context of the right to refuse. A person whose job entails a
threat that will not arise before a supervisor or inspector can be summoned
may be expected to continue to work until an investigation. A worker who
is not satisfied with the response to a call for assistance may, of course,
refuse to work before exposure to risk occurs. Two examples will serve as
illustrations. An employee who is assigned to drive an unsafe truck tomorrow
should not refuse to operate another vehicle today, because exposure to risk
can be averted in other ways. Conversely, a worker who stops work to avoid
exposure to a substance that may cause a disease with a long latency period
should be protected because harm is immediate and only the manifestation
of illness is delayed. The phrase "imminent danger" appears in the Canada
Labour Code.49 Imminence has been held to be determined by the time
necessary to bring a problem to the attention of an employer or an official
and to rectify it.Y° This qualification should be read into other statutes in
order to further their purposes.
A hazard that evokes a work refusal may be the subject of a legal
standard that was designed to prevent exposure to unacceptable risk. What
is the relevance of this norm to a determination that a danger exists justify-
ing a refusal to work? Consider a highly specific standard setting an exact
maximum concentration for an airborne contaminant and a person who
knows that the environment complies with the law, but believes that the
45 See text accompanying note 109, infra. However, the Manitoba Act requires a
worker to report unsafe work and allows him to refuse to work; see s. 5(7).
46 British Columbia refers to "undue hazard"; see B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 8.24(1).
47 Canadian National Railways, [1980] 2 C.L.R.B.R. 344 (Can).
48Inco Metals Ltd., [1980] O.L.R.B. 981.
49 Canada, s. 82.1(1); see also Alberta, s. 27.
50 Canadian National Railways, supra note 47.
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standard is too lax, and so refuses to work. One might respond that the
refusal should not be endorsed because the risk has been approved in the
standard-setting process. Applied to occupational health, as opposed to safe-
ty, this answer is too facile, because the regulatory process cannot keep pace
with scientific discoveries. The decision-making structure attached to an
individual right to refuse case, however, is even more inappropriate for the
resolution of complex health issues than the slow regulatory process, which
can draw upon extensive research and involve the industrial relations com-
munity. For this reason, legal compliance should be treated as conclusive
proof of safety unless there is clear evidence of harm.51 Similarly, an em-
ployer cannot persuasively argue that no danger exists when a standard that
is perceived to be too rigid is exceeded0 2
Industry practice is another reference point that might be considered in
determining the existence of a danger. A practice that contravenes a specific
legal standard obviously cannot be condoned but, even in the absence of
such a rule, industrial norms should not be endorsed without question. Al-
though the failure of an administering agency to curtail a practice might be
equated with state approval, there are two flaws in this equation. A hazard
may escape official scrutiny because it occurs rarely, is a late arrival on the
industrial scene, or has only recently been the subject of scientific inquiry.
Moreover, approval by a front-line inspector in the absence of a review em-
bellished with procedural safeguards should not foreclose further inquiry.
Industrial norms should be considered, but should not be accorded the same
weight as legal standards. "Normal" dangers have been explicitly approved
in several jurisdictions0 3 A statute may refer to hazards that are usual in a
type of employment, indicating that the touchstone is general practice in the
industry rather than the conduct of a particular employer. The word "nor-
mal", standing alone, should be construed in the same way. The designation
"normal" might also be reserved for a hazard that has been carefully evalu-
ated by the administering agency.
A person should be encouraged to escape any danger regardless of its
cause and to refuse to carry out any act that endangers another. All statu-
tory provisions clearly safeguard a worker who refuses to engage in conduct
that would threaten that person. 54 Protection may also be offered to an
individual who will not labour in the face of a hazard arising out of either the
work environment or the actions of another employee, 5 The law in several
provinces, however, is unclear with respect to these causes. The Ontario
statute appears to withhold the right to refuse in the context of a danger
created by the conduct of a co-worker.5 6 In several provinces, protection
1 The case of a worker who is particularly susceptible to a hazard is discussed
below under the heading "Protective Reassignment and Job Security."
52 See Canadian Gypsum Construction, [1978] O.L.R.B. 897.
53 Canada, s. 82.1(12)(a), (b); Alberta, s. 27(2); Quebec, s. 13; Saskatchewan,
s. 26(1).
-4 Supra note 44.
55 Canada, s. 82.1(1)(b); Alberta, s. 27(1)(a); Manitoba, s. 43(3); Quebec, s. 12.
56 Ontario, s. 23(3).
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extends to a refusal to operate a machine or a device that might harm another
person 7 and, elsewhere, to the performance of any task that threatens a
second worker. 8
The right to refuse generally does not extend to fellow employees who
are not at risk but wish to withdraw their services in support of someone who
is in danger. The only exception is Ontario, where an employee may properly
refuse to work because a co-worker in the same workplace is endangered by
a contravention of the statute or regulations.5 9 This provision recognizes that
an individual in danger cannot always be realistically expected to confront
management alone.
In order to minimize exposure to an imminent hazard, a person must
frequently stop work before consulting a supervisor. Consequently, at the
time that a refusal occurs, a worker must independently form an opinion
concerning the existence of a danger. By what standard should this judgment
be tested when an employee is disciplined? Dishonest conduct cannot be
condoned, but protection should not be denied simply because a person is
later shown to have been wrong. Often there will be no sharp delineation
between right and wrong, because the concept of danger is so amorphous.
Even an employee judgment that is subsequently determined to be clearly
erroneous should not be rejected for that reason alone. A person who per-
ceives a hazard cannot afford the luxury of leisurely reflection which may be
aborted by proof that the danger is real. The law in every jurisdiction except
Alberta and New Brunswick protects a worker even though no hazard exists
provided that the employee's perception of danger is reasonable. A range
of factors bearing upon the situation of an individual have been considered
in determining the existence of a reasonable belief: familiarity with a job and
workplace, knowledge of the present situation, and any anxiety arising out
of previous unsafe occurrences or generated by media accounts of occu-
pational illness.00 In this way, the term "reasonable" has taken on a
subjective hue.
An employee who has stopped work is required to inform a supervisor.61
Disagreements concerning the existence of a danger are common and, there-
fore, a statutory dispute resolution process is usually set out. Most procedures
begin with a mandatory investigation carried out by labour and management,
relying upon and enhancing the internal responsibility system. 2 This task is
normally undertaken by an employer spokesman in cooperation with either
a worker committee member, a representative, or a trade union nominee.
5TThis is not true in Manitoba; see s. 43(3).
isAlberta, s. 27(l) (b); Newfoundland, s. 43(1).
59 Ontario, s. 23(3)(c). Cf. Quebec, s. 12.
60 Canadian National Railways, supra note 47; Re Industrial Health and Safety
Regulations (1980), 5 W.C.R. 86 (B.C.).
01 Canada, s. 82.1(2); B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 8.24(2); Manitoba, s. 43(1); New-
foundland, s. 44; Ontario, s. 23(4); Quebec, s. 15.
6 Canada, s. 82.1(3); B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 8.24(3), (4); Newfoundland, s.
43(1)(b); Ontario, s. 23(4); Quebec, s. 16; Saskatchewan, s. 26(1).
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Only in Ontario and British Columbia is the person who declined to work
entitled to participate in this inquiry.63
The dispute is resolved when all parties conclude that a job is safe or
when the worker who refused is persuaded that there is no danger. The
Ontario Act provides that an individual who continues to refuse after labour
and management investigators agree that there is no hazard, enjoys legal pro-
tection so long as the worker continues to have reasonable grounds to
apprehend a danger.64 At this stage, however, an employee must give due
consideration to the opinions of others, especially those with greater experi-
ence or knowledge. 5 In Saskatchewan, a person who will not work after
an unofficial investigation discloses no undue risk is not sheltered from dis-
cipline.0 6 This approach buttresses the internal responsibility system by placing
the ultimite authority in private hands, but labour and management may lack
the expertise to reach an accurate decision. In other jurisdictions, where the
legislation is less clear, the broader protection afforded to Ontario workers
should be emulated because it best fulfills the statutory purpose of safe-
guarding a worker who refuses to work due to a reasonable perception of
danger.
When a dispute is not resolved at the first stage, an inspector generally
must be summoned and may be required to consult the persons who have a
right to participate in an unofficial inquiry. 7 An inspector's decision that
there is a danger that must be rectified may be appealed by management. 8
A contrary ruling that work is safe has widely different consequences across
Canada. In Newfoundland, a person who refuses to return to work is not
protected and cannot obtain review of an adverse decision in the way that
management can. 69 An Ontario employee may continue to refuse without
fear of reprisal even after an official decision that work is safe, but a worker's
conviction that a danger exists must take account of this ruling.70 The legality
of a continued refusal in other jurisdictions is not clear but the Ontario
position again most fully accomplishes the statutory purpose, because an
inspector's opinion will not always be correct. In Ontario, a worker may
also appeal a decision that a job is safe.71
Employers are prohibited from retaliating against a worker who lawfully
exercises the right to refuse unsafe work. An employee whose belief is
unreasonable or who fails to comply with a statutory obligation to report a
03 Ontario, s. 23(4); B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 8.24(3), (4).
64 Ontario, s. 23(6). See also Canada, s. 82.1(4).
65 Canadian Gypsum Construction, supra note 52; Canadian National Railways,
supra note 47.
66 Saskatchewan, s. 26(1). See also Newfoundland, s. 43(1)(b).
67 Canada, s. 82.1(5)-(7); B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 8.24(5); Manitoba, s. 43(1); New-
foundland, s. 45; Ontario, s. 23(7); Quebec, ss. 18, 19.
68 See text accompanying notes 136 to 139, infra.
69 Newfoundland, s. 43(1)(c). See also Canada, s. 82.1(8)-(1l).
70 Inco Metals Ltd., supra note 48.
71 Ontario, s. 32. See also Quebec, ss. 21-24.
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refusal to a supervisor is not protected because he is not acting in accordance
with the law. The types of employer retaliation that are outlawed and the
remedies that may be granted are described below.72
The right to refuse unsafe work is not offered to some workers and is
withheld from others in certain circumstances. In Ontario, a person employed
in police, firefighting or correctional work is denied the right to refuse73 -
perhaps because people in these hazardous occupations are presumed to have
voluntarily accepted all risks arising out of their employment. Persons
employed in a health care institution, residential group home, ambulance
service or laboratory in Ontario are denied the right to refuse when a work
stoppage would place another person in imminent jeopardy.74 The security
of the public is placed above the health and safety of these workers without
regard to the number falling within each category. The balance may be
appropriate for those who enter their employment knowing that it requires
sacrifices to be made for the good of others, but this is not obviously true of
all of the designated categories of workers.
A refusal to work by one person will often affect others in ways that
may be regulated by law. An employee who is directed to perform tasks that
someone else has previously declined is clearly entitled to exercise the right
to refuse. In addition, management's power to assign a worker to fill a
vacancy created by a refusal may be limited. An employee who is assigned as
a replacement in Quebec - even after an inspector rules that work is safe
- must be informed of the earlier refusal and of the reasons for it.75 With-
out notification, the actions of one worker may place another in unknown
jeopardy, but notice may not be sufficient protection for a worker who is less
experienced or knowledgeable than the one who first refused. Until an in-
spector has found that a job is safe, a Quebec employer is prohibited from
assigning anyone to it unless the worker representative involved in an un-
official investigation agrees that no danger exists.76 At the very least, tasks
that have been refused should not be performed before a labour-management
investigation is completed, so that its result is known to the worker who is
assigned.
A refusal that causes a layoff affects the workforce in a different way.
In Quebec, employees who are laid off must be paid.77 This entitlement
ensures that an individual who is contemplating a refusal will not be pres-
sured to continue working by peers who fear loss of their paycheques.
The focus has been upon events beginning with, and following, a refusal
to work. Only in Manitoba can an employee compel an inspector to carry
72 See below under the heading "Discrimination".
73 Ontario, s. 23(1).
74 Ontario, s. 23(2). See also Quebec, s. 13.
75 Quebec, ss. 14, 17, 19. See also Nfld. Reg. 104/79, s. 22(3) and Ontario, s.
23(11).
76 Quebec, ss. 17, 26. This limitation does not apply after a refusal has prevented
two other employees from working for six hours.
77 Quebec, s. 28.
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out an investigation of a perceived danger before work has stopped. 78 This
approach alters the Hobson's choice faced by an employee elsewhere: refuse
and seek statutory protection - which may be denied at worst or awarded
belatedly at best - or continue to work with no right to force an inquiry by
an inspector. For the employee who would choose the latter alternative, the
Manitoba strategy marks an advance as an inspector can be called while work
goes on. Two objections to this scheme might be made: there is no deterrent
to frivolous complaints by an employee who continues to work and is assured
payment; and early official involvement short-circuits the internal responsibility
system. Both criticisms -could be met by permitting only a worker committee
member or representative to initiate an inspection.
V. PROTECTIVE REASSIGNMENT AND JOB SECURITY
Continued employment may pose a threat to a worker's health even
though the job could be performed safely by someone else, because native
susceptibility to injury and disease differs or because the risk associated with
the performance of some tasks increases over time. Even for the majority of
the working population, zero risk cannot be achieved. Greater occupational
hazards may be faced by those who display an unusually low level of
tolerance. What should the legal response be when a person who experiences
an abnormally high risk desires to move to another job? Conversely, should
the state or an employer be allowed to compel a worker to leave a job which
will probably lead to disablement?
Upon request, an employee should be granted protective reassignment
that entails security of both employment and income. Employment security
might be protected by requiring management to transfer a person or by
finding a new employer. An employee may prefer a transfer because it in-
volves less disruption to seniority rights, pension entitlement, working life
and personal affairs. A transfer may not be possible, however, either because
the person cannot perform other jobs or because no safe job exists, as may
frequently occur in a small or highly specialized establishment. In other
circumstances, a transfer may entail costs that would not arise out of new
employment. An employee may need training to work for the present em-
ployer in a new capacity that he would not need to be employed elsewhere.
Second, a transfer to a vacant position may frustrate another worker's claim
to that job pursuant to a collective agreement. Finally, all safe jobs may be
occupied so that a transfer could be accomplished only by interchanging
the person at risk with another employee who may view this switch with
disfavour.79 Conversely, a lengthy quest for new employment may be more
costly than an immediate transfer because an employee who is looking for
work should receive financial support and job search assistance. These are
the factors that must be considered in choosing the best strategy to protect
employment security. When a transfer is not possible new employment is the
78 Manitoba, s. 43(1).
79 Even a change in employment by a worker at risk may result in the assignment
of another employee to replace the first, but this will not occur when someone is hired
as a replacement.
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only alternative. The appropriate response will turn upon the range of con-
siderations that have been identified. To avoid the administrative burden
of case-by-case decisions, all employees could be denied the right to transfer
and be assisted to find new employment.
Regardless of the aproach taken to employment security, an employee
should be safeguarded against loss of income while seeking a job, partici-
pating in a retraining programme, or working at a lower rate of pay than was
previously received. Under workers' compensation schemes, a disabled person
is granted substantial, but not complete, wage protection. The same support
should be granted to a person who leaves a job to avoid injury or disease.
This indemnity, like workers' compensation pensions, should be funded by
employers to ensure that all social costs of production are initially borne by
the producing enterprise.
A person who faces an exceptional risk should be assisted to escape
exposure before any deterioration in health occurs. When any extra peril is
eliminated by a change in either health or mode of production, an employer
should be permitted to re-assign a transferred worker to the original job.
Ought a worker be allowed to demand to be reinstated to that position? The
strongest employee claim arises out of a transfer of brief duration, for ex-
ample, in the context of childbearing. As time passes the adverse effects of a
reinstatement upon other employees and upon management may increase.
The right to protective reassignment turns upon a determination that
a worker is exposed to a danger that others do not encounter. An application
for protective reassignment should be made by a worker to an administrative
tribunal empowered to identify instances of abnormal risk, to award financial
and other assistance, and perhaps to direct an employer to transfer a person
to another job. These tasks involve judgments that are analogous to those
made by agencies that administer workers' compensation benefits, hence
these tribunals are probably best suited to implement a protective reassign-
ment scheme.
The most difficult aspect of protective reassignment remains to be
addressed. Ought an administering agency or an employer be allowed to
compel a worker to leave a job in which that person is subject to unusually
high risk? The costs of disablement will be borne in part by industry and
the public through workers' compensation payments and other social welfare
programmes, but this concern must be weighed against an individual's claim
to job security. Even the most generous indemnity scheme will fall short of
full income maintenance and cannot protect against a loss of pension and
seniority rights or discontinuity in personal and working life. A further con-
sideration is that protective reassignment would be invoked against women
with disproportionate frequency because of the threat to the health of unborn
children.
The current state of Canadian law is unsatisfactory. Only in Quebec
is assistance provided to a worker who wishes to change jobs. 80 An employee
80 Quebec, ss. 32-48.
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whose health shows signs of deterioration or the mother of an unborn or
nursing infant may request reassignment upon production of a medical
certificate stating that a danger exists to worker or child. Management is not
obliged to provide another job, but a person who is not transferred may stop
work and is protected against loss of income by a claim against the employer
for five days' pay and thereafter by a statutory indemnity. An employee is
entitled to return to a former job when able to perform it safely.
Management's power to transfer or discharge an employee with a special
susceptibility is not legally constrained, except in limited circumstances in
New Brunswick.8' Moreover, an employer may be required by law to remove
a person from exposure to hazard, either through termination or reassign-
ment at management's option.82 In Manitoba and Saskatchewan the adminis-
tering agency may direct the transfer of a person who has been overexposed
to a dangerous substance, but only if the worker will recover sufficiently to
be exposed again.A3 Despite the severe consequences for an employee of an
adverse medical opinion, no avenue of appeal is provided in any jurisdiction.
Outside Quebec, a person who is dismissed is offered no assistance, save
perhaps unemployment insurance payments.84
What scope exists for the right to refuse in the context of an abnormal
individual risk? A work refusal may serve as an effective catalyst to bring
about a job transfer or payment of a statutory indemnity. The application of
the right to refuse to a person who faces an above average peril turns upon
the meaning of the word "danger", a term that is broad enough to
encompass a hazard that is not encountered by others performing the same
job. Except in Quebec, where a worker may claim a statutory indemnity, this
construction would oblige an employer either to transfer a worker or to
continue to pay that person while idle. The right to refuse will probably not
be construed to mandate this outcome, because the more appropriate solution
is a protective reassignment scheme that most legislatures have not adopted.
VI. MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS AND OCCUPATIONAL
HEALTH SERVICES
A medical examination provides information which is vital to a worker
and a comprehensive programme of examinations is a crucial ingredient in
epidemiological research. Unfortunately, Canada suffers from an extreme
shortage of physicians trained in occupational medicine.
Canadian occupational health and safety legislation provides for medical
examinations for only a small number of workers: miners everywhere 5 and,
81 A New Brunswick employer is prohibited from altering an employee's status as
a result of information disclosed by a mandatory medical examination; see s. 13(2).
82See text accompanying notes 85 to 87, infra. See also British Columbia, s. 6(5).
83 Manitoba, s. 51; Saskatchewan, s. 30.
84 Payment will be denied to a worker who voluntarily leaves a job without "just
cause"; Unemployment Insurance Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. U-2, s. 41(1).
85 B.C. Reg. 409/59 and 411/59; Man. Reg. 209/79, Nfld. Reg. 104/79, s. 51;
R.R.O. 1980, No. 694, ss. 273-78; Q. Reg. 75-1787; Sask. Reg. 284/78, s. 452.02. In
other provinces the same result is accomplished by other legislation that applies only
to the mining industry.
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in a few jurisdictions, persons exposed to one or more of a range of hazards.8 6
An administering agency may also be empowered to require any worker to
undergo an examination.87 In Saskatchewan, a person holding a designated
job is entitled to be examined upon request once each year, but elsewhere
employees in these occupations must submit to medical scrutiny.
A comprehensive occupational health service offers more constant and
detailed scrutiny of a workforce than periodic examination. A service must
be provided by an employer at a designated establishment in several prov-
inces.88 In Quebec, an occupational health service may be furnished by a
community health department to workers employed in an establishment
without its own service. 9 The Quebec statute provides the most detailed
description of an occupational health programme. It must inform workers
and management of risks and of necessary preventative measures, describe
the health characteristics required to perform a job, identify the characteristics
of each worker and establish a register of employees exposed to designated
contaminants. s0
The selection of a physician to conduct examinations is most commonly
made by an administering agency, but may be delegated to an employer.91
Outside the realm of employment the right of an individual to choose his own
physician is not disputed. Why not permit a worker to select an occupational
physician? One reason for rejecting individual choice is that co-workers may
select different specialists, so that no doctor would acquire a comprehensive
understanding of the workplace and of the health of the workforce, know-
ledge which is necessary to properly diagnose industrial disease and to draw
accurate etiological conclusions. This concern could be overcome by allowing
employees as a group to appoint a doctor. Similarly, a physician in charge of
an occupational health service could be chosen and instructed by workers.
This position has generally been filled by a doctor employed by management,
and critics have charged that their relationship influences medical findings
and inhibits disclosure of both risks and latent disease to employees. Under
the Quebec Act, the physician in charge of a mandatory health service is
86As to silicone see: B.C. Reg. 283/68; Man. Reg. 209/77; Nfld. Reg. 104/79,
s. 51; Q. Reg. 44-479, s. 31; Sask. Reg., s. 106. As to asbestos see: Man. Reg. 209/77;
Nfld. Reg. 104/79, s. 51; Q. Reg. 44-479, s. 31; Sask. Reg., s. 119; see also Public
Health Act, R.S.A. 1974, c. 294 and Alta. Reg. 75/71. As to compressed air see:
R.R.O. 1980, No. 691, ss. 249-60. As to lead see Q. Reg. 74-1576, s. 9.8.1; Q. Reg.
44-479, ss. 67, 68; see also Public Health Act, loc. cit. and Alta. Reg. 3/72. As to
benzol see: Q. Reg. 44-479, s. 57. As to noise see: B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 13.35; Q. Reg.
72-3787, s. 5.33(b).
87 C.R.C. 1978, c. 997, s. 37(l)(b); Alberta, s. 19(2); Manitoba, s. 49(1); New
Brunswick, s. 13(1); Newfoundland, s. 56; Q. Reg. 72-3787; Saskatchewan, s. 29(1).
88 Manitoba, s. 52; Newfoundland, s. 51; Ontario s. 15(1) (a); Quebec, s. 227(28).
To date, the only designation applies to employees exposed to lead in Quebec: Q. Reg.
44-479, ss. 67-68.
89 Quebec, ss. 109, 115.
00 Quebec, s. 113.
91 B.C. Reg. 283/68.
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chosen by a committee or, in the event of a deadlock, the Commission, and
the health programme is approved in the same way.92
The cost of medical services, like workers' compensation pensions and
protective reassignment indemnities, should be financed by assessments upon
employers. In Saskatchewan, an employer must pay for an examination, 8
but elsewhere no provision is made for payment and the cost may fall upon
workers whose provincial medical insurance plan does not cover this service.
The physician in charge of a mandatory health service in Quebec is re-
munerated by the state.94 In several provinces, employees examined during
working hours are protected from loss of pay.05
The provision of medical services by a doctor who is not retained by
an individual employee may strain the traditionally confidential relationship
between patient and physician. In the context of occupational medicine,
confidence not only serves a basic human right to privacy but may also
indirectly protect job security by denying an employer knowledge of an
adverse medical condition. Even if a claim to continued employment which
may lead to disablement is not valued, privacy should be protected by dis-
closing to management only a finding of good or poor health and no other
details. In Saskatchewan, the results of a medical examination cannot be
divulged without an employee's consent, except to the administering agency.90
VII. STANDARDS AND ADVANCE APPROVAL
The strategies discussed to this point have a common theme: the primary
responsibility for health and safety rests with workers and employers. The
law creates new rights to be consulted, to refuse unsafe work and to pro-
tective reassignment, as well as new duties to provide medical examinations
and information. The incidence of injuries and disease, however, will largely
be determined by the conduct of labour and management within this minimal
legal framework. The heavy hand of government regulation, which has not
yet entered the picture, moves into the foreground when mandatory standards
are set.
The rationale for standards is that an unregulated labour market fails
to adequately control hazards. Poor information about dangers, barriers to
worker mobility and irrational reactions to low probability risks of serious
harm combine to prevent workers from protecting themselves, from demand-
ing that jobs be made safe or from obtaining a risk premium. Employers pro-
duce too little health and safety because they too lack knowledge of hazards
and, despite the payment of partial compensation for lost wages, do not bear
the full social cost of injury and disease. The right to refuse to work and access
to information about dangers only partially correct these market failures,
92 Quebec, ss. 79, 112, 118.
03 Sask. Reg., ss. 106, 119. See also B.C. Reg. 283/68.
94 Quebec, s. 111.
95 Alberta, s. 16; Manitoba, s. 49(2); Newfoundland, s. 57; Saskatchewan, s. 29(2).
96 Sask. Reg., ss. 106, 119; see also Manitoba, s. 50(3).
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because an employer retains a broad discretion to design the work environ-
ment to maximize profits and is under little economic incentive to control
hazards. The case for standards is strongest with respect to conditions that
may produce disease, as opposed to injury, as experts know much more than
workers and employers about industrial illness whereas everyone experiences
substantial difficulty in identifying the causes of many accidents.9 7 Standards
are widely utilized across Canada, although the relative emphasis placed upon
standards and other strategies varies from one jurisdiction to another.98
Government regulation is under attack of late and occupational health
and safety standards have received more than their share of criticism.99 One
objection is that the law will often specify an expensive means to achieve a
desired level of performance even though management could devise a cheaper
means to accomplish the same end. This critique can be met by designing a
standard that prescribes only the appropriate level of performance, allowing
employers to determine the manner of attaining that objective. In other
words, a performance standard could be utilized instead of a specification
standard. Most jurisdictions have adopted rules of both types. In Ontario an
employer may depart from a specification standard if the safeguards provided
and those specified are equal with respect to "strength, health and safety."'100
Uniform performance standards are criticized by economists who argue
that because costs of compliance differ greatly among employers, the greatest
amount of health and safety can be achieved at the least cost by requiring
higher than average performance of establishments with low costs while
permitting high cost employers to perform at a lower level. These variant
management responses can be encouraged by experience-rated workers' com-
pensation assessments. Although laudibly efficient, at least theoretically, this
strategy standing alone would produce enormous distributional inequities,
as workers in high cost enterprises are forsaken in the name of economy.
Experience-rating has been adopted in several provinces as a supplement,
rather than as an alternative, to minimum standards. Pseudo-market incentives
offer another advantage over either type of standard by inducing employers
to control both hazards that lie beyond the foresight of regulatory bodies
and dangers that cannot be detected by inspectors.
Critics of regulation also charge that standards are frequently based upon
inaccurate measurements of either the severity and probability of harm or the
costs of compliance. No one has a greater interest than labour and manage-
ment in assuring that these facts are accurately determined and often they
9 7 Mendeloff, Regulating Safety (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1980).
08 Canada, s. 84; Alberta, s. 31; British Columbia, s. 71(1); Manitoba s. 18; New
Brunswick, s. 23; Newfoundland, s. 63 and Nfld. Reg. 104/79, s. 24(4) (a); Nova
Scotia, s. 19; Ontario, ss. 20(1), 41; Prince Edward Island, s. 77; Quebec, ss. 66, 223;
Saskatchewan s. 13.
99 De Bernardo, OSHA: Overpriced and Under the Gun (U.S. Chamber of Com-
merce, 1979); Nader et al., Business War on the Law; An Analysis of the Benefits of
Federal Health/Safety Enforcement (New Jersey: Rothman, 1979).
o0 R.R.O. 1980, No. 692, s. 2.
1982]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
have knowledge that is not readily available to government. Consequently,
their participation in the standard-setting process should reduce errors. In
addition to making these factual determinations, regulators must place a value
on life and health, a highly political task that cannot be avoided. Too often
this decision, which should be made in a public process, is not explicitly ar-
ticulated, not even privately. Workers have a special claim to participate in
thig exercise because occupational dangers, unlike environmental or highway
hazards, affect only a segment of society and those at risk are neither random-
ly chosen nor, given labour market imperfections, voluntarily exposed. The
value placed upon life should be constant so that a fresh determination should
not be made each time a new hazard is regulated.
Public participation is mandated by law in only three jurisdictions.' 0'
In Ontario, before a final standard relating to a biological, chemical or
physical agent is adopted, the minister must publish a proposed version and
receive comments from labour and management.
A hearing must be held by the British Columbia Workers' Compen-
sation Board prior to the promulgation of any regulation, and presumably
submissions made at a hearing may be controverted. Notice of a proposed
standard, a right to make comments, and an opportunity to contest adverse
submissions are essential to effective participation, but more is required. The
administering agency should be obliged to disclose the evidence upon which
a draft regulation is based so that labour and management are not forced to
aim their comments at a hidden target. In addition, reasons for adopting the
final standard should be published to encourage sound judgments.' 02
No regulatory agency can anticipate all hazards that will emerge in the
future and provide detailed standards to control them. Substances not pre-
viously known to man are constantly introduced into commercial use. Work
processes, tools and equipment are also continually changing. New building
designs are adopted and plants are built where none previously existed. The
most common response to these developments is to wait until a material,
device or structure is in use before its consequences for the well-being of
employees are evaluated. There are two obvious problems with this approach:
workers serve as guinea pigs and the retro-fit costs of correcting defects may
be high or even prohibitive. These difficulties could be avoided by requiring
official approval in advance of utilization, manufacture or construction.
Advance approval schemes of varying scope have been adopted in
several provinces. 10 3 The most comprehensive programme is set out in the
Ontario Act. The manufacture, distribution or use, except for research pur-
poses, of any biological or chemical agent not listed in an official inventory
is prohibited until notice is given to the administering agency, which is
empowered to prohibit or restrict the use of a substance. 04 The inventory
I'1 British Columbia, s. 71(1); Ontario, ss. 20(2)-(5), (12), (22); Quebec, s. 224.
102 See Ontario, s. 20(2).
_13 Alberta, ss. 1(k), 10(3); Nfld. Reg. 104/79, s. 5(1).
104 Ontario, s. 21.
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that has been adopted was compiled by the Environmental Protection Agency
in the United States.105 Similar notice requirements and powers exist in
Quebec. 10 An Ontario employer is also required to submit plans and
specifications for scrutiny before beginning a construction project or installing
any equipment.107
VIII. GENERAL DUTIES: EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEES AND OTHERS
Employers are typically charged with a general duty to take all pre-
cautions necessary to ensure the health and safety of the workforce.'
08
Similarly, employees must exercise due care to protect themselves and their
co-workers. 109 In the absence of a specific provision, for example, to provide
information concerning a substance or to maintain air quality at a precise
level, the employer's general duty might be utilized to require management
to perform in a particular way. However, enforcement agencies, especially
the courts, may be reluctant to take this step.
The employer's general duty is commonly supplemented by an obligation
to train" 0 and supervise"'. workers. In Ontario management must set out
written instructions for prescribed jobs but no designations have yet been
made.1 2 A Quebec employer must appoint a person to be responsible for
health and safety.113 In that province, and in British Columbia, management
may be required to develop a comprehensive health and safety programme
which sets out objectives and provides for the implementation of legal
standards. 14 A health and safety programme in British Columbia must des-
cribe the responsibilities of an employer, workers and supervisors and provide
for periodic management meetings. Programmes in one or both of these pro-
vinces must also address the training and supervision of workers, inspections,
accident investigations, personal protective equipment, and maintenance and
disclosure of records - including inspection and accident investigation
reports. The Quebec Occupational Health and Safety Act requires that a
description of the programme, together with a committee's comments on it,
be forwarded to the Commission, which may direct that it be amended."15
The Quebec and British Columbia aproaches go beyond the law elsewhere by
105 Ontario, s. 20(1) and R.R.O. 1980, No. 693.
100 Quebec, ss. 64-66, Nfld. Reg. 104/79, s. 24(4) (a).
107 Ontario, s. 18(3), R.R.O. 1980, No. 692, s. 7 and R.R.O. 1980, No. 694, s. 21.
108 Canada, s. 81(1), (2); Alberta, s. 2(1); B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 2.04; Manitoba,
s. 4(1); New Brunswick, s. 7; Newfoundland, s. 4; Ontario, s. 14(2)(g); Quebec, s. 51;
Saskatchewan, s. 3(a).
109 Canada, s. 82; Alberta, s. 2(2); Manitoba, s. 5(a); Newfoundland, s. 6; Ont-
ario, s. 17; Quebec, s. 49(2)-(3); Saskatchewan, s. 4(a).
110B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 8.20; Manitoba, s. 4(2)(b); N.B. Reg. 77-1, s. 3(7);
Newfoundland, s. 5(b), (e); Ontario, s. 14(2)(a); Quebec, s. 51(9).
11B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 8.20; Manitoba, s. 4(2)(b); Newfoundland, s. 5(6);
Ontario, s. 14(2)(a); Quebec, s. 51(9).
112 Ontario, s. 51(l)(c), (i).
113 Quebec, s. 51(2).
114 B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 4.02; Quebec, ss. 58-60. See Alberta, ss. 20, 26.
115 Quebec, s. 60.
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compelling management to think through its policies and to air them for
scrutiny by officials and workers.
In a few jurisdictions duties are also imposed upon individuals, other
than employers and employees. Supervisors may be required to provide
instruction and supervision in safe work practices.116 The Ontario Act con-
tains a long list of supervisory duties and a very broad obligation to take all
reasonable precautions to ensure that the work environment is free of
hazards." 7 Only in Quebec are suppliers subject to comprehensive regulation:
no person may manufacture, sell, or install any product or process unless it
conforms to legal standards 18 and a supplier of a dangerous substance must
ensure that it is labelled"19 and has been approved by the administrating
agency.' 20 New hazardous materials must also be approved in Ontario.' 21 In
several provinces, a supplier may not rent any tool or equipment that is not
safe. 22 Finally, a principal contractor, defined as the owner of a work site or
the person primarily responsible for work carried out on it, may be directed
to safeguard employee health and safety.'23
IX. THE INSPECTORATE
Inspectors employed by the administering agencies perform several
functions. They are commonly called upon to resolve disputes arising out
of refusals to work 24 and may also carry out accident investigations. Most
of an inspector's energy is devoted to routine, periodic visits to workplaces to
check for contraventions of occupational health and safety standards. Inspec-
tions are scheduled by the administering agency. As noted above, a worker
can compel an investigation of a perceived danger only by first refusing to
work, except in Manitoba where an official may be summoned while work
goes on.' 25
Inspectors are granted a broad range of investigative powers.120 In addi-
tion to entering premises, examining books and records and taking samples
116 B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 8.20. See also New Brunswick, s. 8(2) and Sask. Reg.
282/69, s. 14.08.
"7 Ontario, s. 16.
118 Quebec, s. 63.
119 Quebec, s. 67.
120 See text accompanying notes 104 and 106, supra.
121 Ontario, s. 21.
122Alberta, ss. l(l), 2(3), (4); Newfoundland, ss. 1(/), 11; Ontario, s. 19(a)(b).
This obligation extends in Ontario to a lessor who agrees to maintain equipment and
in Alberta to a lessor who agrees to install or erect equipment.
123 In several provinces, this obligation applies only to the construction industry:
New Brunswick, ss. 1, 5; Ontario, ss. 1(4), 13; Quebec, s. 196. Elsewhere all industries
are embraced: Alberta, ss. 1(j), 2(5); Manitoba, ss. l(n), (o), 7; Newfoundland, ss,
2(j), 10. The Ontario provision also extends to owners outside the construction in-
dustry: s. 18.
124 See text under heading "The Right to Refuse," supra.
12 See note 78 and accompanying text, supra.
126 Canada, s. 91(2), (3); Alberta, s. 6; British Columbia, s. 71(3); Manitoba, s.
24; New Brunswick, s. 15(1); Newfoundland, s. 24; Nova Scotia, ss. 7, 11; Ontario,
s. 28(3); Quebec, ss. 179, 180; Saskatchewan, s. 17.
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for analysis, in several provinces they may take photographs, make record-
ings, conduct any other tests and be accompanied by an expert. The most
complete authority is found in Ontario where an inspector may direct that
any equipment or process be operated for the purpose of examination or may
request an employer to provide an expert's report concerning any structure,
process or any biological, chemical or physical agent. A Quebec inspector
may order the installation of a measuring device in a workplace. 2 7
An official who visits a worksite only periodically and briefly may fail
to observe a hazard that would be detected by those who are present through-
out every working day. For this reason, the quality of inspections is improved
by consultation with management and labour representatives and by their
accompaniment on a "walk around". An employee spokesman is entitled
to accompany an inspector in several provinces128 and in two others, manage-
ment cannot object to worker participation although an inspector is not
directed to allow an employee to participate. 129 The employee is generally a
worker committee member or representative or is chosen by a committee or
union. In British Columbia and Saskatchewan, a worker who accompanies
an inspector must be paid. 130 In addition to permitting one employee to "walk
around", a Saskatchewan employer must allow any worker to consult with an
inspector who may require that a person be temporarily relieved without loss
of pay.131 An employer representative is entitled to accompany an inspector
in three provinces." 2
Inspectors are empowered to direct adherence to the applicable act or
regulations. 33 Except in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, they may
also order that all work be stopped until compliance is achieved: the criteria
ranges from a danger, to an imminent danger, to a serious danger.134 The
modifier "serious" imposes an unnecessarily strict test. As in the context of
refusals to work, the term "danger" alone should be interpreted to embrace
only an imminent hazard that could not be corrected before persons who
continued to work would be exposed to risk. The issuance of a stop work
order might adversely affect employees who are laid off without pay and,
therefore, the law in two provinces requires that employees who are deprived
of work be paid.135
127 Quebec, s. 180(b).
128Alta. Reg. 197/77, s. 10(1); British Columbia, s. 72; Man. Reg. 158/77,
s. 7(1); Nfld. Reg. 104/79, s. 21(5). In Newfoundland and Alberta this right arises
only where a committee or worker representative exists.
129 Ontario, s. 28(3); Sask. Reg., s. 26.
"
0 British Columbia, s. 72(8); Sask. Reg. 437/81, s. 26.
131 Sask. Reg. 437/81, s. 26.
1'2Alta. Reg. 197/77, s. 10(4); British Columbia, s. 72; Nfld. Reg. 104/79, s.
21(5).
133 Canada, ss. 94, 96(1); Alberta, ss. 7-10; British Columbia, s. 74; Manitoba, ss.
26, 33, 36; New Brunswick, s. 15(2), (3); Newfoundland, ss. 25-28; Nova Scotia,
s. 9(1), (2); Ontario, s. 29 (1), (2), (4); Prince Edward Island, s. 71(3); Quebec,
ss. 182, 186-90; Saskatchewan, s. 18(1)-(3).
134 Id.
35 British Columbia, s. 74(2); Quebec, s. 187.
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An administrative appeal may be taken by management from an order.
The reviewing body may be either a higher officer within the agency that
employs the inspector who issued the directive130 or an outside tribunal,18 7
commonly a labour relations board. Several jurisdictions provide for a second
level of review by a labour relations board or the courts. 138 Yet, across most
of Canada, workers are denied the basic right to contest official inaction.
Only the Ontario Occupational Health and Safety Act allows an appeal from
a refusal to issue an order, and thereby allows employees to challenge an
inspector's opinion that management conduct is legal.'39 Another important
procedural safeguard that has nowhere received statutory recognition is
the right of labour and management to participate in an appeal launched by
the other.
X. SANCTIONS
The contravention of occupational health and safety legislation, regu-
lations or orders may lead to criminal prosecution. 140 In addition, the British
Columbia Workers' Compensation Board may levy an administrative penalty
upon an employer.'41
The primary responsibility for initiating criminal prosecutions or penalty
proceedings must rest with the administering agencies because employers,
workers and unions often lack the expertise, resources or motivation to take
these steps. Labour and management, however, should be allowed to launch
enforcement proceedings. In Alberta and British Columbia, prosecutions can-
not be initiated without the consent of either the administering agency or the
attorney general, and employees can be prosecuted under the Canada Labour
Code only with the minister's approval. 42 Elsewhere, any citizen may initiate
a criminal action.
Enforcement agencies rely heavily upon compliance orders and rarely
commence proceedings which may lead to the imposition of a sanction.
Canadian occupational health and safety law provides no criteria for identi-
fying violations for which penalties should be sought, so that administering
agencies must develop their own guidelines. Consequently, these guidelines
may not be carefully articulated, consistently applied or exposed to public
scrutiny. These pitfalls could be avoided by stipulating in regulations or legis-
lation the factors that are to be weighed in each case. Three criteria that
136 Canada, ss. 93, 96(2)-(4), 106.1; Alberta, s. 11; B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 2.12;
Manitoba, ss. 37-39; New Brunswick, s. 15(b); Newfoundland, ss. 30-31; Nova Scotia,
s. 9(3)-(5); Ontario, s. 32; Quebec, ss. 191-192; Saskatchewan, s. 20(1).
'37 Canada, s. 95; Alberta, s. 11; Manitoba, s. 37.
138 Alberta, s. 11(5)-(6); Manitoba, s. 39(1); Newfoundland, s. 31; Saskatchewan,
s. 21.
139 Ontario, s. 32(5).
14OCanada, s. 97(1), (3); Alberta, s. 32(1); British Columbia, ss. 75(2)-(3);
Manitoba, s. 53; New Brunswick, s. 21; Newfoundland, s. 64(1); Nova Scotia, s. 23;
Ontario, s. 37(1); Quebec, ss. 236, 237; Saskatchewan, s. 32.
14'British Columbia, s. 73; see also Prince Edward Island, s. 78.
142 Canada, s. 98(2); Alberta, s. 32(3); cf. British Columbia, s. 75(4).
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might be considered are: the actual or potential harm to workers posed by a
violation; the violator's "state of mind", which may range from willful through
reckless, negligent and careful; and past violations of the same or another
standard. The factors that have been listed are necessarily vague and, in a
particular case, some criteria may favour sanctions while others point to the
opposite conclusion, so that competing considerations must be balanced.
Consequently, these guidelines preserve a degree of flexibility but permit an
administering agency to be called upon to justify its decisions by references
to general principles. A small number of more rigid rules might also be
adopted. For example, a penalty might be mandatory for every willful
violation that seriously compromises worker health.
An employer may attempt to escape liability by demonstrating that all
reasonable precautions were taken to prevent an impugned occurrence. Some
statutory duties are qualified by a phrase such as "so far as is reasonably
practical." The Supreme Court has ruled that a defence of due diligence may
be successfully raised even though it is not explicitly allowed by statute.143
The judiciary cannot apply this defence when legislative language expressly
precludes it, but Ontario is the only province that limits the defence of due
diligence by statute. For example, an employer in Ontario who fails to
provide information, training or protective devices as prescribed or who
violates a standard that limits exposure to a chemical agent is strictly liable.
However, management may escape criminal responsibility in Ontario for
failing to achieve results that depend upon the co-operation of workers: an
employer is only obliged to take reasonable precautions to ensure that
employees utilize protective devices and follow proper work practices.144
The financial penalties that an employer may face vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction.145 Maximum fines are commonly set, ranging from $50,000
in Quebec to $500 in Nova Scotia. Several statutes permit a further levy for
each day that a violation has persisted.14 Typically, no minimums are fixed
nor is any statutory guidance provided with respect to the exercise of
discretion. The Quebec Occupational Health and Safety Act structures sen-
tencing by providing different maximum fines for individuals and corpora-
tions, for contraventions that seriously compromise the health and safety of
workers and other violations, and for first and subsequent offenders. This
statute also fixes minimum fines, ranging up to $10,000 depending upon the
nature of the violation.147 Employees, supervisors, and suppliers are generally
143 R. v. City of Sault Ste. Marie, [1978] S.C.R. 1299, 85 D.L.R. (3d) 161, 3 O.R.
(3d) 30.
44 Ontario, s. 37(4). See also R. v. Inco Ltd., unreported, March 1981 (Ont.
Prov. Ct.).
'45 Canada, s. 97(2); Alberta, s. 32(1), (2), (2.1); British Columbia, ss. 73,
75(2), (3); Manitoba, s. 54(1), (2); New Brunswick, s. 21; Newfoundland, ss. 64(1),
(2); Nova Scotia, s. 23; Ontario, s. 37(1); Prince Edward Island, s. 78; Quebec, ss.
236, 237; Saskatchewan, s. 33.
146 In British Columbia, the maximum fine is an amount equal to the employer's
annual assessment.
147 Quebec, ss. 236, 237; see also Alberta, s. 32.
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subject to the same fines as an employer,148 although the Canda Labour
Code sets a lower maximum penalty for workers and in Quebec they do not
face the stiffer penalties that apply to corporations.' 49 A conviction may lead
to imprisonment for a term up to twenty-four months in Saskatchewan. A
Manitoba court may -order a person not to work in a position of authority
over employees during the six months following conviction. 1 0
The structure of authority in a workplace is hierarchical and those at the
top exercise influence over hazardous conduct of others. The law in British
Columbia, Ontario and Quebec encourages the use of this power by holding
an employer vicariously liable for the conduct of members of management,
supervisors and employees, 15 usually subject to a due diligence defence.1 2
Attributing criminal responsibility to management is most effective if liability
is focused upon an individual because an impersonal entity can neither suffer
the stigma of a conviction nor be imprisoned for a serious offence. A director,
officer or agent of a corporation who participates or acquiesces in a corporate
violation may be convicted in Manitoba and British Columbia. 53
A criminal prosecution is a slow process and may be inappropriate where
an ongoing violation continues to endanger health and safety. In Ontario,
the administering agency may proceed expeditiously by filing an ex parte
application for a judicial order restraining contravention of a stop-work
directive.'5 Breach of this order would constitute contempt of court.
XI. DISCRIMINATION
A major thrust of Canadian occupational health and safety legislation is
the encouragement of worker participation. Any retaliatory action by em-
ployers must be curtailed to accomplish this objective. The prohibited dis-
criminatory action against a person who refuses to perform unsafe work has
been discussed. 5 There is a broader proscription against discrimination in
most jurisdictions. 56 Protection may extend to a worker who acts in com-
pliance with or seeks the enforcement of a statute or regulation. This compre-
hensive formulation protects a worker who refuses to perform unsafe work,
148 Saskatchewan, s. 33. See also: Alberta, ss. 32(1), (2), (2.1); British Columbia,
s. 75(2); Manitoba, s. 54(3); Newfoundland, s. 64 (1); Ontario, s. 37(1).
149 Canada, s. 98(1); Quebec, ss. 236, 237. In British Columbia the maximum fine
for employees is $10,000.
l5 Manitoba, s. 54(4).
151 B.C. Reg. 585/77. s. 2.16; Ontario, s. 37(3); Quebec, s. 239.
152 This may not be so in Ontario; see note 144 and accompanying text, supra.
53 British Columbia, s. 77; Manitoba, s. 55; see also Canada, s. 104 and Sask-
atchewan, s. 34.
164 Ontario, s. 31; see also Alberta, s. 33.
15 Canada, s. 97(l)(d), B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 8.24(6); Alberta, s. 28; Manitoba, s.
43(3); New Brunswick, s. 8(3), (4); Newfoundland, s. 47(d); Ontario, s. 24; Quebec,
s. 30; Saskatchewan, s. 26(2).
'56Canada, s. 97(1)(c); British Columbia, s. 13(2); Manitoba, s. 42(1); New
Brunswick, s. 8(3); Newfoundland, s. 47(3)(a)-(c); Ontario, s. 24(1); Quebec, ss. 30,
81, 97; Saskatchewan, s. 25(1). In Manitoba, discrimination by a trade union is also
forbidden; s. 42(1).
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gives testimony in enforcement proceedings, has any association with a
committee or representative, provides information to an inspector,157 or
seeks to persuade an employer to comply with the law. Legislation in several
jurisdictions sets out a list of protected activities, which is invariably
incomplete.
The prohibition is commonly against any type of reprisal. How is this
ban to be applied to a person who refuses to perform unsafe work? An em-
ployer should be permitted to reassign a worker to reasonable, alternative
employment for the duration of a refusal. An employee who is either not
reassigned, and so remains idle, or is transferred to a lower paid position
should be remunerated at the rate for the job that was refused. Several
statutes explicitly recognize management's power to transfer a person who
has refused to work' 58 and expressly prohibit any loss of pay. 159 Outside the
context of work refusals, all transfers should be viewed as discriminatory.
Regardless of the setting, the notion of discrimination should embrace dis-
ciplinary warnings, demotion, denial of a transfer or promotion, and any
reduction in wages or benefits. Several provinces have rejected a broad
definition of discrimination in favour of a list of proscribed reprisals, which
is often not exhaustive.
An employer - or person acting on behalf of an employer - is pro-
hibited from taking any of the proscribed steps against a worker who has
engaged in a protected activity. Consequently, motive is a crucial ingredient
of an offence. An employer often will act with more than one purpose, but a
violation should be found whenever any part of management's motivation is
tainted by illegality. This is the approach that has been consistently followed
by Canadian courts and labour relations boards in entertaining complaints
of discrimination against trade union members.'6 To prove the existence of
an illicit design is often a difficult task. For this reason, an employee should
be expected to establish only that he engaged in protected conduct and that
discriminatory action followed and an employer should then be called upon
to demonstrate the absence of an unlawful motive. In several provinces the
burden of proof has been reversed in this fashion.16
An employer who retaliates against a worker is subject to the penalties
that apply to any violation. 1 2 Except in Alberta and New Brunswick, an
employee may be reinstated and obtain compensation for lost wages.' 63
'57 Section 93(4) of the Canada Labour Code provides additional protection to
informants by prohibiting disclosure of their names.
158 Newfoundland, s. 43(2); Ontario, s. 23 (10); Quebec, s. 25.
159 Canada, s. 97(l)(d); B.C. Reg. 585/77, s. 8.24(7); Newfoundland, s. 43(3).
160 See The Labour Relations Law Casebook Group, Labour Relations Law (3d ed.
Kingston: Queen's University, 1980) at ch. 3.
161 Manitoba, ss. 42(2), 43(4); Newfoundland, s. 48; Ontario, s. 24(5); Sask-
atchewan, ss. 25(2), 26(3); cf. Quebec, s. 228.
102 See text under heading "Sanctions," supra.
163 Canada, ss. 96.1-96.4; British Columbia, s. 75(1); Manitoba, s. 44(3); New-
foundland, s. 50(l)(a), (b); Ontario, s. 24(2)-(4), (6)-(8); Saskatchewan, s. 27;
Quebec, ss. 229-231.
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These remedies are commonly dispensed by a labour relations tribunal,104
which may also be empowered to reinstate a worker pending a final deci-
sion 165 or to substitute a lesser penalty for one imposed by management.100
XII. AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT
Ministries, independent tribunals and courts take part in the regulation
of occupational hazards in every jurisdiction, but the division of labour
among these bodies varies across the country. What should be the assignment
of responsibilities? This question is best addressed by distinguishing among
three functions performed by government: setting health and safety stand-
ards, conducting inspections and attempting to obtain voluntary compliance,
and enforcing the law by adjudicating alleged violations and fashioning
penalties and other remedies.
Adjudication is everywhere conducted by a body that is independent of
government, either the courts or an administrative agency. An employee who
has been the victim of discrimination typically may obtain compensation and
reinstatement at the hands of a tribunal.16 Other sanctions are generally
dispensed by the courts, but the British Columbia Workers' Compensation
Board may levy a financial penalty. 68 The administrative process may be
well suited to this role. Judicial attitudes to white-collar crime, particularly
where no ascertainable injury or disease has been caused by a violation, may
unduly limit enforcement. The judiciary may also construe statutory pro-
visions and regulations so strictly that the legislative purpose is frustrated,
because it or the factual context is not clearly understood by an inexpert
court. Court proceedings - including precisely drafted documents, rules of
evidence and the criminal burden of proof - are costly and time consuming
and may shift the advantage too far in favour of the alleged violator to the
detriment of those whose health and safety is at risk. Finally, a criminal court
will probably prefer fines for past violations to other sanctions whereas a
specialized tribunal is more likely to utilize such remedies as stop work
orders and ongoing financial penalties for continuing violations. The criminal
process should not be abandoned, but it should be held in reserve for extreme
situations in which the stigma of conviction, perhaps followed by imprison-
ment, is appropriate and the safeguards of the criminal law system are
essential.
In most jurisdictions, the remaining functions are assigned to a govern-
ment ministry, but there are important exceptions to this general pattern.
Regulations in British Columbia and Quebec are promulgated by an in-
dependent agency. The political act of placing a value on health and
114 Where a grievance procedure exists a worker may utilize it or have recourse to
a statutory tribunal: Ontario, s. 24(2); Quebec, ss. 232, 233; cf. Reed Ltd., [1978]
O.L.R.B. 1; but see Newfoundland, s. 49(2).
15 Quebec, s. 229.
166 Ontario, s. 24(7).
167 See, supra notes 164 to 166 and accompanying text.
188 See, supra notes 140, 141 and 162, and accompanying text.
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safety should be undertaken by officials who can he held accountable through
the political process. Once this task is performed, standard-setting is largely
an exercise in fact-finding with respect to the degree of hazard and costs of
compliance. Isolating the standard-setting process from political pressures
ensures that these determinations are made in an even-handed fashion. Equal
treatment also requires an independent inspectorate. Although the criminal
law analogy might suggest the contrary, this analogy is inapt because the
enforcement of occupational health and safety law is not as widely approved
by persons with the power to influence government decisions as in the appli-
cation of law designed to protect property and to control violence. The
inspectorate is independent in British Columbia and New Brunswick and may
be so rendered by cabinet order in Quebec. 169
Should responsibility for standard-setting, inspections and adjudication
be assigned to the same agency, or is the separation of these powers desir-
able? A single body, which could co-ordinate all three functions and draw
upon a common pool of expertise, might deliver the most effective prevention
programme.
The imparitiality of an adjudicator may be strained, however, by employ-
ment in the same agency as an inspector who gathers evidence against an
accused. To combat bias, the adjudication and inspection functions could be
assigned to separate tribunals or inspections and first level adjudications
might be performed by a single authority whose decisions could be appealed
to a second body. The latter alternative ensures a measure of impartiality,
co-ordination and shared expertise. The British Columbia prevention system
combines standard-setting, inspection and adjudication in a single agency,
but allows no outside appeal. 170
The argument for an omnibus agency may be carried further. The re-
sponsibility for controlling hazards should be exercised by the same agency
that administers benefits to disabled workers. A compensation system has the
potential to generate information concerning the causes of injuries and
diseases that is vital to an effective prevention programme. In addition, a
single body can select the best mix of prevention strategies, such as
experience-rated workers' compensation assessments, support for the internal
responsibility system, and enforcement of standards. Finally, an umbrella
agency may be expected to launch a more vigorous prevention programme
than an authority whose jurisdiction does not extend to compensation. This
is because an increase in resources devoted to a successful control programme
can be partly financed by a reduced compensation workload and because
heightened employer resistance to greater prevention efforts would be offset
by enhanced management goodwill generated by lower assessment rates.
Workers' Compensation Boards in British Columbia and Prince Edward
Island are responsible for both compensation and prevention.
169 British Columbia, ss. 71(3), 74; Occupational Health and Safety Commission
Act, S.N.B. 1980, c. 0.001, s. 7; Quebec, s. 193.
17oSee text under the headings "Health and Safety Committees and Represent-
atives" and "The Right to Refuse", supra.
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XIII. CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE
Three challenges were identified at the outset: to buttress the internal
responsibility system, to establish a framework for the creation and enforce-
ment of minimum legal standards, and to address health concerns.
Labour's claim to participate in shaping the work environment has not
received adequate recognition. The committee system and the right to refuse
have not been adopted in two provinces. Worker committee members outside
Quebec have no power to alter any management practice that conforms to
minimum legal standards of general application. In Quebec, authority over
medical services, training, information, and personal protective devices is
removed entirely from management and vested in a joint committee, or, in
the event of a stalemate, the Commission. Legislatures elsewhere should
identify areas in which real responsibility can be shared betweeen labour
and management in this way. In several provinces the prohibition of em-
ployer retaliation against workers who participate in the control of hazards is
too narrow or the remedy of reinstatement is not available. The right to know
has been ignored in some jurisdictions and disclosure requirements that have
been enacted are typically too vague and do not provide access to information
in the possession of government or suppliers. The internal responsibility
system is in need of additional legal support.
The most glaring inadequacy in the standard-setting and enforcement
processes is the denial of procedural safeguards to both labour and manage-
ment. Across Canada rules may be promulgated without the three basic ele-
ments of due process-notice, public submissions, and reasons for decision.
Although management may appeal a compliance order, workers typically
cannot contest an inspector's decision not to issue a directive. Only the
administering agency can initiate a prosecution in two provinces.
Canadian occupational health and safety legislation has also failed to
provide the weapons for the battle against industrial disease. Few employees
are offered medical examinations or other health services, or are entitled to
claim protective reassignment. Employers are not explicitly required to in-
form a person who encounters a regulated substance of either the level of
exposure or the associated risk. Outside Ontario and Quebec, new chemical
and biological agents may be introduced into the workplace without official
clearance.
In short, the response of the Canadian legal system to the challenges of
a hazardous work environment displays serious deficiencies.
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